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INTRODUCTION
I begin with great thanks to the Wisconsin Law Review for the
opportunity to be a part of this timely and important conversation about
executive power and administrative governance. I have been invited here
to share my work on negotiated federalism, which explores the way that
good multiscalar governance is often the product of intergovernmental
bargaining among decision makers at various levels of government. As I
have described in this work, negotiations are sometimes conducted
purposefully, in statutorily prescribed ways, and elsewhere more
serendipitously or even inadvertently, as a byproduct of the wider
political process. The privileged constitutional status of the federal and
state governments brings special attention to the negotiations that take
place among state and federal actors, but similar dynamics apply in
negotiations involving local, regional, national, and international actors.
And while all three branches of government participate in different forms

*
Elizabeth C. and Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State
University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, M.A., Wesleyan University, B.A.,
Harvard University. I thank Miriam Seifter for inviting me to this program, all
participants for our productive exchange there, and Jill Bowen for her research assistance
preparing this essay for publication. I remain grateful for all the support, critique,
and
inspiration from colleagues over the years who have helped me develop and refine the
research distilled in this essay.
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of negotiated governance (some more and less obvious), the executive
branch features especially prominently in these efforts.
For this symposium, I would like to distill a few important points
from my research about the need for negotiated governance and the
options for accomplishing it.1 The project began with a series of law
review articles that culminated in Negotiating Federalism, which
identified the pervasive use of intergovernmental bargaining as a tool for
dealing with jurisdictional uncertainty.2 In that piece, I described the
phenomenon of federalism bargaining, provided a taxonomy of ten basic
ways in which it takes place, and proposed a theory for discerning the
circumstances in which it can serve as a uniquely bilateral form of
constitutional interpretation.3 Those ideas became the basis of a later
book, Federalism and the Tug of War Within, which folded the concept
of negotiated governance into a general theory of Balanced Federalism.4
Balanced Federalism diagnoses the inevitable conflicts among the
underlying values that animate federal systems of government, and the
book explored how they are managed (some more and less successfully)
by various means of consultation, competition, and collaboration.5
Federalism and the Tug of War Within was filled with vivid
examples from environmental and land use law, realms that are
notoriously rife with federalism conflict and have accordingly inspired
interesting means of negotiated resolution.6 For that reason, I was later
asked to contribute the closing chapter to a book specifically addressing
environmental federalism, The Law and Policy of Environmental
Federalism.7 In that piece, I applied Balanced Federalism and negotiated
1.
See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010); Erin
Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007); Erin Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the Separation of Powers Both
Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 4 (2015) (a response to Aziz Z.
Huq’s The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014)); Erin
Ryan, Response to Heather Gerken’s “Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a
Détente?”, 59 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1147 (2015); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and
Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 COLO. L. REV. 1003 (2014); Erin Ryan, The Once
and Future Challenges of American Federalism, in THE WAYS OF FEDERALISM IN
WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN, VOL. 1
(Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio eds., 2013); Erin Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum Game, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4 (2012).
2.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4–5.
3.
Id.
4.
ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011).
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at xv.
7.
THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015).
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governance theory to bridge the collection’s separate analyses of
different areas of environmental law.8 I will especially draw from that
chapter here because environmental law uniquely highlights both the
need for negotiated governance and the available variety of innovative
approaches to accomplish it.
From this prior body of work, this conversational essay draws out
two separate themes, digesting the implications of negotiated federalism
for: (1) administrative environmental governance; and (2) American
federalism in general. The latter takes us into heavy theoretical territory,
but the first half eases into it, using environmental law as a substantive
laboratory to demonstrate the challenges in American federalism that
have led us toward negotiated governance in all fields. Part I thus begins
by exploring why environmental law seems always at the epicenter of
federalism controversy—why it is, as I have previously called it, the
“canary in federalism’s coal mine.”9 In Part I, I will ask why
environmental controversies become so intense that they require
negotiated resolution, and I will suggest that it has to do with both the
nature of environmental problems specifically and the nature of
American federalism itself.
Having set the substantive stage for our more abstract conversation,
I will delve into the contribution that federalism itself makes, showing
how the very nature of American federalism is also responsible for the
dilemmas that lead us toward negotiated resolutions. Federalism, after
all, is a strategy for good governance—a means of accomplishing the
underlying good governance values that the Constitution envisions, and
for coping with the inevitable values conflicts identified in Balanced
Federalism.10 Part II reveals how unresolved issues in constitutional
interpretation lead to persistent jurisdictional uncertainty, encouraging
the use of negotiation to mediate multiscalar governance disputes. It
considers how state-federal bargaining is not only a rational means of
coping with jurisdictional uncertainty, but deployed effectively, a wise
means that confers benefit up and down the jurisdictional scale. Flirting
with issues treated more deeply in the book, it ponders the significance
of all this for the ultimate questions federalism begs: how to decide
exactly who gets to decide which regulatory policies.11

8.
Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 355 (Kalyani
Robbins ed., 2015).
9.
This point was provocatively demonstrated at our symposium by the State
Attorneys General panel, in which environmental controversies were raised more often
than any other substantive area of law.
10.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 34–67.
11.
Id. at xii–xiii.
AND
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In Part III, I will bridge Part II’s conversation about federalism’s
underlying values clash back to Part I’s discussion of environmental law,
demonstrating negotiated environmental federalism as an innovative
technology of good multiscalar governance. Part III touches on the ways
that environmental law has responded to federalism’s challenge at the
structural level, experimenting with various means of asymmetrically
allocating regulatory authority to encourage different valences of
consultation, negotiation, collaboration, and competition. It shows how
different approaches to cooperative federalism can be adapted to procure
distinct mixtures of local and national input. I will conclude with
reflections on the critical insight with which the phenomenon of
negotiated federalism should leave us: despite centuries of rhetoric to the
contrary, federalism need not be, and indeed never has been, a zero-sum
game.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS THE CANARY IN THE COAL MINE
I begin with the proposition that environmental law uniquely
showcases the need for, and also the potential for, negotiated federalism.
Negotiated multiscalar governance is a response to problems of
jurisdictional conflict that are raised in many areas of law, but they are
raised acutely in environmental law. In prior work, I have called
environmental law “the canary in federalism’s coal mine,”12 and this
Symposium’s panel of State Attorneys General reinforced that point,
focusing frequently on controversies surrounding the Clean Power
Plan,13 the Clean Water Rule,14 the Good Neighbor Rule,15 National
Monument designations,16 energy harvest on public lands,17 and so forth.
Why is this so?
In fact, this special relationship is also reflected in the Supreme
Court’s federalism and environmental law docket. Perhaps you have
noticed that many of the Supreme Court’s most contentious federalism

12.
Id. at 358.
13.
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
14.
Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
15.
Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72 et al.).
16.
Michael Margherita, The Antiquities Act & National Monuments: Analysis
of Geological, Ecological, & Archaeological Resources of the Colorado Plateau, 30 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 273, 275 (2017); Executive Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (May 1,
2017).
17.
Executive Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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cases are, in reality, environmental cases. New York v. United States,18
the first case of the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” revival, is
known for establishing the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering
doctrine—but of course, it’s really an environmental case about siting
hazardous radioactive waste. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
Reclamation19 is another famous Tenth Amendment case, but it is
substantively about managing the harmful effects of mining activities. At
the same time, many of the Supreme Court’s most contentious
environmental cases are, in reality, federalism cases. Both Rapanos v.
United States20 and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cooke County v.
United States21 are nominally statutory interpretation cases about the
Clean Water Act—but they are suffused with constitutional anxiety of
the reach of the federal commerce power. EPA v. EME Homer City
Generation22 is a Clean Air Act case, but it is really about federal
preemption. So why is it that environmental law is so often at the
epicenter of federalism controversy?
My argument, in a nutshell, is that environmental governance is
uniquely prone to federalism controversy because environmental laws
allocate power in regulatory contexts where both the state and federal
claims to authority are simultaneously at their strongest.23 The big
question in federalism controversies is always the same—it is some
variation of the theme: “Who gets to decide?”24 Is this something that
should be handled centrally, with the same answer for everyone? Or
should it be handled locally, where the answer may differ depending on
where you are? The federalism debate will be over whether the state or
federal government gets to call the shots, and environmental federalism
debates are especially raw because environmental law is the place where
both the state and federal claims to authority—the argument each side
will make about why it should be the one to decide—are unusually
strong. Why is that?
We can probably come up with a few reasons for this, but the first
one has to do with the very nature of environmental problems.
18.
505 U.S. 144 (1992), 159–66 (invalidating key enforcement provisions in
the state and federally negotiated Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act).
19.
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (concluding that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 did not violate the Tenth Amendment).
20.
547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (limiting federal authority to regulate certain
wetlands under the Clean Water Act).
21.
531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001) (limiting federal authority to regulate
hydrologically isolated wetlands under the Clean Water Act).
22.
134 S. Ct. 1584, 1584–85 (2014) (upholding EPA’s Clean Air Act interstate
pollution regulations).
23.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 372.
24.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at xii.
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Environmental problems very often match the need to regulate the
harmful use of a specific parcel of land—something we normally think
of as a local matter—with the need to regulate the boundary-crossing
harms associated with that use.25 And boundary-crossing harms, by
definition, impact interests that go beyond the local jurisdiction.
The resulting jurisdictional clash becomes immediately clear.
Americans share a hallowed understanding that regulating land use is
among the most sacred of local prerogatives—part of the very backbone
of the police power to protect public health and safety.26 Nevertheless,
the need to regulate spill-over harms and externalities is among the
original predicates of national authority.27 Indeed, our first take at
nationhood (under the Articles of Confederation) failed precisely because
it lacked the stronger national power that the Constitution ultimately
conferred to deal with interstate conflict.28 At some ironic level, then, the
reason environmental federalism is so hard is because everyone is just so
right—at least about why their chosen side deserves the final say.
Now, you might reasonably respond, “Maybe so, but what’s so
special about environmental law?” Don’t we see the same conflict
playing out between the police power and later assertions of federal
authority in all sorts of other legal realms—like criminal law, health law,
education law, and family law? Aren’t these all facing the very same
problem? The answer, of course, is—yes! Powerful federalism
controversies have recently erupted in every one of these areas of law,
from debates over immigration enforcement to health insurance reform
to same-sex marriage.29 It’s just that environmental law got there first—
and in many respects, environmental federalism conflicts can be
viscerally worse, or even more resistant to resolution. Especially in the
United States.
The reason has to do with the intimate relationship between
environmental law and the land, especially given the enormously
diverging character of land across our nation.30 And while the shape of
the land can impact other legal problems (for example, the delivery of
health, education, or emergency services), the diversity of the underlying
land remains a much more salient factor in environmental management
than most other areas of law. Of course, the diversity of the American
people is a source of national pride—we are a great, big, delicious salad

25.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 372.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 59.
29.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
355–56, nn.1–10 and accompanying text (documenting a list of contemporary federalism
controversies in all areas of law).
30.
Id. at 372.
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bowl of different kinds of people with unique needs and preferences—
but no matter how different our communities may be, the land beneath
them is even more different. And this is really the bottom line: land is
more different than people.
Much more different, as it turns out. Think of the varying American
landscape—from sea to shining sea, and not to mention all those islands
in the middle of said sea. From purple mountains majesty to red rock
desert, Pacific Northwest rainforests to Gulf Coast bayou, from the heat
of Death Valley to subarctic Alaskan tundra. So, if the question is
whether we are going to make this decision locally (with different
answers for different people, depending on where you are) or nationally
(with the same answer no matter where you are)—then the fact that land
is more different than people turns out to be very significant.
In fact, the whole “where you are” piece may matter a lot more
when it has to do with environmental management than when it has to do
with, say, criminal law. After all, murder is murder—but pollution
management is going to be completely contingent on the landscape.
Important differences between local communities should clearly register
in effective policy-making, but even though communities can be very
different, we still have fairly widespread consensus about what
constitutes “public health,” or “theft,” or “math.”31 And even where state
law differs in these areas, it differs mostly at the margins. After all, math
is math (although we may differ on how we prefer to teach it).32 By
contrast, environmental management is geographically idiosyncratic—it
varies widely, radically even, between the states, and sometimes even
within states because the land we are regulating on top of is so unique.33
To give an example, think about what you would need to do to
manage water pollution in a state like Florida, where summer rains
regularly drench the ground. Development is constructed around an
ambitious system to channel drainage, and one of the most productive
freshwater aquifers in the world flows just beneath the surface of much
of the state.34 What kind of measures would you consider to prevent
surface pollutants from infiltrating the state’s water resources? If you

31.
Id. at 372–73.
32.
See Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values
in Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. [manuscript p. 32-34]
(forthcoming, 2017).
33.
Id.
34.
ERIC H. LIVINGSTON & ELLEN MCCARRON, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. REGULATION,
STORMWATER
MANAGEMENT:
A
GUIDE
FOR
FLORIDIANS
(1991),
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/nonpoint/docs/nonpoint/Stormwater_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q65X-86LC]; USGS, GROUND WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1990),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730/ch_g/G-text6.html
[https://perma.cc/9AKJXBG3] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
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have an idea in mind, even a foggy one—now think of what you might
have to do instead to manage water pollution in a desert state like
Arizona. Or a plains state like Iowa. Or the contrasting urban, rural,
mountainous, coastal, and agricultural environments in states like New
York or California.
As you can imagine, each scenario requires a wholly different set of
expertise and management strategies. To wit, consider this partial list of
what you would need to account for in managing water pollution in these
areas. You would need to know: the contours of the land, the elevation,
the precipitation, seasonal weather patterns, prevailing winds, watershed,
soil quality, habitat, population density, zoning laws, cultural uses, local
economies, where the local industry is operating at any given time, what
the major stressors are in that particular area, and so on.35 These answers
are going to be different in each place. And you would probably have to
be there on the ground to know these things, and more to the point, to
keep track as they change over time, as they inevitably will.
None of this means that the federal government cannot play an
important role. After all, our system of regional administration ensures
that somebody will be there on the ground to follow all this from an
appropriate vantage point.36 However, it does mean that the answer to the
question of what environmental managers should do to manage water
pollution may be wildly different in all of these different circumstances.
And in the environmental context, getting the answer wrong can be
extremely costly. Bad environmental decisions made without the benefit
of local expertise can portend serious environmental, cultural, and
economic harms if things go wrong. Damage to soil, water, and other
local resources can create devastating consequences for entire
communities. This, of course, is the case for local decision making in the
environmental context.37
Yet here’s the rub: if one community fails to prevent environmental
spillovers to another community—that will portend the very same harms.
The stakes are equally high for the unlucky neighbors. And that, of
course, is the case for national decision making.38 Which is why, of
course, we have both! The problem is figuring out how to get all these
well-intended decision makers working well together, and as we’ll see,

35.
36.
79 (2016).
37.
38.

Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 373.
See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58,
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 373.
Id.
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this very often turns out to be through various forms of consultation,
collaboration, competition, and other forms of negotiation.39
Regulatory realms like this, where the state and the federal
governments have simultaneous interests and obligations, constitute a
zone of jurisdictional uncertainty that I have previously described as the
“Interjurisdictional Gray Area.”40 These are realms of jurisdictional
overlap, like environmental law, where both the state and federal
governments have legitimate claims to regulatory authority. And if the
federalism issue is “Who gets to decide?”, then these claims to regulatory
authority pose an especially vexing problem for us. If both sides have a
legitimate claim to authority, then how do we decide who gets to decide?
The Constitution gives us valuable guidance: there are the enumerated
federal powers, there are a few constitutionally assigned state
responsibilities, the Tenth Amendment suggests that there are additional
reserved state powers, and the Supremacy Clause would appear to
adjudicate conflicts.41 It all looks very tidy on paper—but in reality, we
know that it’s not at all tidy.
Every federalism controversy is a realm in which jurisdictional
overlap has raised questions about who should get to decide. The
Supremacy Clause suggests that federal authority overrides when there
are conflicts, but even that does not fully resolve the issue because there
are different ways of managing jurisdictional overlap.42 Should we draw
a boundary line down the middle and clarify that on this side of the line
only the state will regulate, and on the other side, only the feds?
Environmental law, for example, has taken that approach with wetlands
regulation—attempting to differentiate between those subject to the
federal Clean Water Act and those that are not.43 Alternatively, should
we allow concurrent regulation within a statutory framework?
Environmental law often takes that approach through “floor preemption”
regimes, in which both state and federal laws may operate, so long as
state regulation does not undermine some federally mandated
minimum.44 For example, states and localities can regulate ambient air
pollutants more stringently than the federal Clean Air Act, but not less
so.45

39.
See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4–5. See also Erin
Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, supra note 1, at 567-95.
40.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 145.
41.
Id. at 145–214.
42.
See id. at 145–80, 271–314.
43.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 391.
44.
Id. at 395.
45.
Id.
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In this respect, many of the most interesting debates about
preemption have shifted from questions about whether the federal
government could preempt state regulation to questions about whether it
should preempt state involvement, even when it could.46 There are many
areas of law in which the federal government could theoretically preempt
state authority all the way down the regulatory scale under one of its
constitutionally enumerated powers—but it specifically chooses not to do
so, in order to enable the benefits of local regulation that outperforms
federal capacity.47
II. FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN
This brings us to the second half of the analysis—the role that
federalism itself plays in fomenting constitutional controversy, and in
forcing us to the jurisdictional bargaining table. To facilitate this part of
the conversation, I would like to convince you to think about federalism
perhaps differently from the way the discourse has conventionally
framed it. I want to persuade you that federalism is more than just a
contest between state and federal reach.48 It may express itself that way,
but that contest is more a symptom than the underlying problem. Nor is it
merely a contest between judicial and legislative interpretative
supremacy, though the discourse often focuses on that conflict as we
wrestle with the underlying problem.49 Nor should we see it as just
another contest between original intent and living constitutionalism,
though proponents on each side may position it that way.50
What I would like to convince you (and if I could persuade you to
read my book, maybe I would!), is that federalism is nothing more, and
nothing less, than a strategy for good governance, based on a clear set of
values. Federalism is a strategy—an innovative technology of good
governance—representing our best attempt to accomplish a set of basic,
good-governance principles in the system of government we have
created.51 The principles at the heart of this project are very important. I
call them “federalism values” in prior work, but what I mean there is that
these are good-governance principles that we are trying to actualize
through federalism. We created a federal system of dual sovereignty on
the belief that federalism was likely to increase the salience of these
values in our day-to-day experience of government. And I suspect you
will recognize this list of the top five federalism values.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 393.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 12.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at xi.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
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First, federalism enables checks and balances between local and
national authority that help protect against government overreaching or
abdication on either side of the line.52 It is a familiar point, and both
environmental and civil rights law showcase many famous examples in
which the regulatory backstop feature of federalism has played a critical
role.53 Second, we hope that federalism will protect accountability and
transparency in governance, by enabling meaningful democratic
participation along all points of the jurisdictional continuum.54 Third,
federalism promotes local diversity, innovation, and competition—
making space for the great “laboratory of ideas” that we admire so much
in dual sovereignty.55 But fourth, we also like the way federalism
provides strong national authority to deal with spillover harms, manage
collective action problems, and vindicate core constitutional promises.56
Finally, federalism allows us to harness the interjurisdictional synergy
that arises between the unique governing capacity that inheres at both the
local and national levels—different sets of skills and expertise that we
need to reach the different parts of complex problems that cannot be
solved at either end of the spectrum exclusively.57 Interjurisdictional
synergy—the space that federalism creates for multiscalar problemsolving—is the fifth (and most overlooked) value of federalism.
The invention of federalism yielded an unprecedented technology of
good-governance to enhance access to these values in democratic
systems of government.58 And I want to emphasize that when we talk

52.
Id. at 39.
53.
Id. at 42–43.
54.
Id. at 48.
55.
See id. at 50–59.
56.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 366.
In the original TUG OF WAR book and article, I discuss the four federalism values most
directly voiced in American federalism jurisprudence: checks and balances, transparency
and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving value implied by
subsidiarity. RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 34-67.
The values of centralized authority are implied by the value of intergovernmental
problem-solving synergy, but in later exploration of the material, I added more overt
discussion of how centralized power counterbalances localism values within federalism.
See, e.g., Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 362-64.
Because the values of central administration are implicit in the creation of an overall
nation-state, they are debated less directly in the many cases that presume centralized
national authority but debate its appropriate relationship with subnational authority.
However, as the dynamic federalism discourse progressed, I decided it was worth
highlighting the values of central administration more explicitly as the fifth in the series.
57.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 59.
58.
For excellent historical accounts of the invention of American federalism,
see ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010);
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 177–79 (2007).
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about being faithful to federalism, we should recognize that what we are
really talking about is being faithful to these underlying federalism
values. We often forget this, wrapped up in the politics of the moment,
but we should keep this touchstone at the forefront of constitutional
analysis. When we ask “Who should get to decide—the state or federal
government?”, at some irreverent level the answer is: “Who cares?” The
real question is, “How are we going to be most faithful to these values?”
“What will help us achieve the best balance in the present
circumstance?” Whether it should be the state or federal government
depends on whatever allocation of power is going to get us closer to
these values in this particular context.
But of course, there is another rub, and this one is federalism’s “tug
of war within”: what do we do when the different federalism values point
that analysis in multiple possible directions? This is a serious problem
for American federalism, and all multiscalar governance systems. The
federalism values I’ve described are all associated with good governance,
and proponents of democratic process generally hold them all in high
esteem. Few Americans are really against any of these values as a matter
of principle. Even so, the problem is that we cannot always satisfy all of
these values all at the same time.59 In fact, they are suspended in a virtual
web of tension with one another, and when they conflict, we have to
make hard decisions about which value will take priority. This is obvious
for some of the values—for instance, there is clear tension between
values of localism and nationalism—but if you look more closely, you
will find that there are actually deep tensions running among all of
them.60
For example, take the first two on the list: checks and balances on
the one hand, and accountability and transparency on the other.61
Everyone praises transparent and accountable governance, but consider
this: the purpose of this value is to empower voters to hold elected
representatives to account for their performance in government service.
If we really wanted the most transparent and accountable governance
possible, then the truth is that federalism (deep breath!) is probably a bad
idea. After all, federalism is pretty confusing to the average voter, who
has to keep track of two different sets of laws and elected
representatives, not to mention the different aspects of government for
which each is responsible. If things are going badly and voters want to
“throw the bums out,” think of how much harder that is when voters have
to adjudicate between two separate sets of bums! Consider how much
more straightforward this would be in a unitary system, where voters
deal with only one set of laws and representatives. Monitoring multiple
59.
60.
61.

RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 39–44.
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levels of governance in a federal system makes it substantially harder for
individuals to hold the right representatives accountable for the results of
poor performance. And yet we generally tolerate this unwieldy feature of
federalism because we really want to reap the checks and balances that
those two sets of bums enable.
Then again, if checks and balances were the most important value in
governance, then we should probably lose the Supremacy Clause, which
gives federal power an upper edge in so many jurisdictional conflicts.62
Instead, we could just let the local and national sides fight it out, and may
the best idea win! But we don’t do that either, because we want to
preserve strong federal power to help manage pesky collective action
problems, like interstate commerce. And we want to be able to foster
interjurisdictional synergy between local and national power, to manage
complicated problems like water pollution with an able blend of national
standards and local implementation.63 And so on.
The point is that the tensions between these values are real, and we
have to find a way to manage them where they conflict in administration.
And the big challenge is that—unabashed fan though I am—the
Constitution is not terribly helpful to us in doing that.
The underlying problem is that the Constitution mandates, but
incompletely describes, our system of dual sovereignty.64 It mandates
federalism as a strategy for good governance, but it provides an
incomplete design for this new governance technology. It tells us that we
are going to have dual sovereignty, and it tells us a little bit about what it
is going to look like, but it does not tell us much about how to deal with
the inevitable problems that arise within this system of dual
sovereignty.65
Coping with these problems requires that we turn to some
exogenous theory of federalism—one that you just can’t find within the
Constitution itself—to help us make good choices about how to balance
these values and manage these tensions.66 In the end, we have no choice
but to draw on theory—or some notion about what federalism means or
is for—to fill in the blanks that are inevitably left open when the
Constitution’s relatively vague federalism directives are applied to actual
cases and controversies.

62.
Id. at 43. See also Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within,
supra note 8, at 365.
63.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
365–66.
64.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at xiv.
65.
Id. at 7-17.
66.
Id.
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Over the years, a critical result of this problem has been the
spectacular vacillations of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence
as the Court has experimented with different theoretical models over
time.67 You will probably recognize some of these models. The “Dual
Federalism” model prevailed in the 19th century,68 and it was revived
during the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism Revival of the 1990s,69
which sought to minimize the interjurisdictional gray area as much as
possible. The “Cooperative Federalism” model that came to power after
the New Deal70 tolerates greater jurisdictional overlap in the gray area
and best describes the current structure of U.S. governance, but it
maintains tension with some principles of the Court’s New Federalism
jurisprudence.71 There have been a series of newer theories of federalism
that all try to grapple with these unresolved federalism problems in
different ways, including Erwin Chemerinsky’s Empowerment
federalism,72 Robert Schapiro’s Polyphonic federalism,73 and my own
theory of Balanced Federalism.74
Whatever theory appeals most to you, it is important to
acknowledge the result of this roiling federalism discourse for actual
governance in the gray area—and that result has been an awful lot of
uncertainty about exactly how gray area governance should operate.75
The people who actually have to carry on governance in contested realms
of law face an enormous amount of uncertainty about how exactly to
manage that jurisdictional uncertainty—how exactly to share and divide
regulatory authority in contexts of jurisdictional overlap.76
About ten years ago, I decided to try and find out what they were
doing to manage it, and I spent a number of years collecting anecdotal
information about these dilemmas from anyone in state or federal
government who would talk with me about it. It was a fascinating
journey, and the headline was that for many of them, the way they
managed this uncertainty was simply to negotiate their way through it.77
67.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
367–68.
68.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 86–87.
69.
Id. at 97. See also id. at 121.
70.
Id. at 89–98.
71.
Id. at 96–98.
72.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 165 (2008).
73.
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 91 (2009).
74.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 181.
75.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4–5. See also RYAN,
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 249, 324.
76.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4–5. See also RYAN,
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 249, 324.
77.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 5.
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They worked together with counterparts on the other side of that statefederal line, both directly and indirectly, to jointly construct gray-area
policies in a surprising variety of ways.78 Negotiation theorists define
negotiation as a process of joint decision making through an iterative
process of exchange,79 and once I learned where to look, I saw it
everywhere.
In other words, in contexts where it really was not clear who should
get to decide, state and federal actors had worked out various ways of
deciding together, by means that ranged from straightforward dealmaking to more subtle forms of intersystemic signaling and other forms
of policy exchange resulting in jointly constructed governance.80 When
thus engaged, whether purposefully collaborating or inadvertently
competing or dissenting to decide, they are effectively deciding
together.81 The discovery of just how much federalism-sensitive
governance is actually the product of some form of negotiation is what
launched my last ten years of research.
In the original Negotiating Federalism article, and later in
Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I described many of these
methods in a taxonomy of ten different forms of federalism bargaining,82
including outright horse-trading in legislative design or criminal
enforcement;83 reallocating constitutional authority under the Spending
and Compacts Clauses;84 and elaborate joint policy making forums, such
as the Clean Water Act or Medicaid, statutory programs designed to
facilitate state and federal coordination in producing collaborative
governance outcomes.85 Many of these represent sophisticated examples
of how to refine the good-governance technology of federalism to meet
specialized demands within different areas of substantive law.

78.
Id. at 24–101; RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra
note 4, at 280–314.
79.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 5; RYAN, FEDERALISM AND
THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 268.
80.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 19–24; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 276–80.
81.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 102–20; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 339–56. See also Jessica Bulman-Pozen
& Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Heather
K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
82.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 28–73; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 280–314.
83.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 28–36; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 283–87.
84.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 37–50; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 288–96.
85.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 50–73; RYAN, FEDERALISM
AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 296–314.
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III. NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM

Having considered the problems and promise of federalism in
general, let us steer the conversation back to our opening consideration
of environmental federalism. At this point, I would like to explain why
everything we have learned about federalism theory contributes to why
environmental law has always been the canary in federalism’s coal mine.
Now we understand that there are pressing conflicts between the
underlying federalism values in many contexts of governance—
federalism’s “tug of war within.”86 And at the end of the day, in every
context where the tug of war arises, we have to decide which values are
going to take precedence. In many legal realms, we do a reasonable job
of reaching a general consensus. For example, there is a solid consensus
that military action should be a federal affair.87 We do not always
achieve universal agreement, but there is usually enough of a
majoritarian view that we can move forward in a consistent direction.
In other areas of law, it becomes harder to reach that consensus, and
especially in environmental law, it seems we almost never can.88 That’s
why the Clean Power Plan, the Clean Water Rule, and the Good
Neighbor Rules have prompted such enormous controversy (as the State
Attorney Generals participating in our program confirmed here). In
environmental law, the values conflict is exquisitely difficult because
each of the values are pulling hard for preeminence. In many
environmental federalism disputes, there is nothing close to consensus.
In my book chapter, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, I
analyzed the multiple Supreme Court opinions in three federalismsensitive environmental decisions, New York v. United States,89 Rapanos
v. United States,90 and Massachusetts v. EPA,91 to show how different
justices reached different conclusions in the same case on the bases of
different values analysis.92 I won’t rehash all the details in this short
essay, but in each case, the different authors came to a different
conclusion about which underlying values should prevail in the same
context (and each on the basis of strong, if conflicting, arguments).93
In the same piece I also demonstrated the values tug of war in the
realm of energy law, including debates over the regulation of fracking
86.
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 34–67.
87.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
88.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 387.
89.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
90.
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
91.
549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007) (upholding a state’s challenge to the federal
agency’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act).
92.
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
379–85.
93.
Id.
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and renewable portfolio standards, where consensus-resistant contests for
power span the jurisdictional spectrum.94 Jurisdictional disputes in
energy law implicate wrenching questions of local autonomy and
centralized efficiency, and especially notably, they are as likely to arise
between the local and state levels of government as between the state and
national levels.95 The multiscalar jurisdictional controversies of energy
law highlight an important failing in the larger federalism discourse, and
one with special resonance for environmental and land use law. It is the
way that problems of jurisdictional overlap reverberate all the way up
and down the jurisdictional scale in ways that are often constitutionally
invisible, because the Constitution only acknowledges these conflicts
when they arise between state and federal actors.96
In this essay, I have been using ‘local vs. national’ vocabulary to
refer to state and federal actors because these are the two levels of
government the Constitution considers. However, if we substitute the
vocabulary of ‘local vs. central,’ we can bridge this discussion to related
jurisdictional debates about the states’ preemption of local regulations,
not only over issues of fracking and energy harvest, but the regulation of
short-term real property rentals (such as Airbnb), local antidiscrimination
laws, minimum wage laws, and others.97 We could use the very same
vocabulary to bridge our discussion to related debates between member
nations and the European Union over environmental and immigration
policy that span multiple nations.98
In multiscalar governance systems like ours, the same “who should
decide” jurisdictional dilemma takes place between every level of scale.
Questions of when to centralize or decentralize decision making prompts
municipal-state conflicts, regional conflicts among separate states,
international conflicts among separate nations, and even international
conflicts among national governments and other transnational institutions
such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and the

94.
Id. at 377–78.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 379.
97.
Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 927, 929 (2015); Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1066, 1069–72 (N.D. Cal. 2016); NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE BY STATE ANALYSIS (2017);
Lauren Doroghazi, Heat Between Cities and States Rises as Local Preemption Continues,
MULTISTATE INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.multistate.us/blog/heat-betweencities-and-states-rises-as-local-preemption-continues
[https://perma.cc/KM6A-KG39]
(last visited Aug. 29, 2017).
98.
See Erin Ryan, Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for
Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society, 96 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(describing federalism and secession conflicts in the European Union).
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International Court of Justice.99 Opportunities for conflict and
cooperation arise diagonally across subnational units within states, in
separate nations, or even among subnational units and other nations.100
Familiar issues pervade these disputes, each balancing calls for voice,
accountability, autonomy, efficiency, and interdependence.101
Returning to the specific context of environmental governance,
environmental federalism disputes resist consensus with special force
because they match strong claims for both decentralized and centralized
decision making, they prompt fierce clashes among other federalism
values, and they trigger intense competition among multiple levels of
would-be governmental decision makers. And as noted in Part I, there
are often compelling arguments on all accounts.
Nevertheless, environmental governance has responded to these
challenges with noteworthy innovations—new inventions, as it were, of
good-governance technology. In Federalism and the Tug of War Within,
I described ten overarching ways in which government actors negotiate
through jurisdictional uncertainty,102 and in Environmental Federalism’s
Tug of War Within, I explored more specifically how environmental
governance has tailored different statutory formats for intergovernmental
bargaining.103 Analyzing the major programs of cooperative
environmental federalism, I identified four basic regulatory approaches
that asymmetrically allocate authority among local and national actors in
different ways, enabling joint environmental governance that draw on
complementary aspects of state and federal capacity.104 This broad
typology includes methods of Coordinated Capacity, FederallySupported State Implementation, Conditional Preemption, and Shared
and General Permitting Programs.105
Coordinated Capacity programs partner the distinct regulatory
skillsets of state and federal actors in a relatively straightforward
manner—for example, the Emergency Planning and Community Right99.
Id.
100. Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications
for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 2011; Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying
Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008); Judith Resnik, Foreign as
Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in
Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007).
101. See Ryan, Secession and Federalism in the United States, supra note 98
(analyzing centralization and decentralization disputes in terms of competing calls for
autonomy and interdependence).
102. RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 280–
314.
103. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
366–67.
104. Id. at 400–12.
105. Id.
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to-Know Act (a component piece of the Superfund statute), which
engages state and local experts in coordinated planning for chemical and
other emergencies.106 These programs mandate state and federal
coordination on interjurisdictional problems but with limited interaction,
like “parallel play” among young children.
Other environmental federalism partnerships offer states greater
regulatory choices in more developed programs of interaction. In
programs of federally-supported state implementation, Congress offers
financial and technical resources to states in exchange for their help
implementing federal goals. These laws assign local and national actors
complementary roles with different relative strengths. For example, the
Coastal Zone Management Act provides assistance for states to create
coastal management plans that are approved by federal regulators, but it
then constrains federal decision-making in conformity with the state plan
in regulated coastal areas.107 These plans encourage coordinated decision
making, but the state maintains the discretion whether to participate.108
Other programs create an even stronger federal role. In the
Conditional Preemption model pioneered in environmental law, states
choose between implementing federal standards themselves or accepting
federal regulation of in-state activity to meet federal standards.109 State
and federal actors follow this model in sharing supervision of the Clean
Water Act’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, which
prohibits pollution discharges into protected water bodies without a
permit (under permitting systems required by federal law but usually
managed by the states).110 Some environmental laws merge the carrot of
federally-supported state implementation with the stick of conditional
preemption. For example, the Clean Air Act111 combines federal standard
setting with state implementation that is required to avoid penalties
associated with various sanctions, including the potential loss of federal
highway funds.112
Environmental law has also pioneered the use of general permitting
programs to coordinate state and federal authority in realms of

106. 42 U.S.C. § 11001–11002 (2012).
107. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280
(1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012)).
108. RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 303
(discussing the mechanics of the CZMA).
109. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 404.
110. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
111. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2012).
112. Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, supra
note 1, at 1009–17.
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jurisdictional overlap.113 General permits have been used to harmonize
state activity with federal goals when a federal agency wishes to
maximize state discretion and minimize the regulatory burden for permit
applicants. Applicants receive permission to engage in a federallyregulated enterprise by following a general set of instructions that
provide guidance about acceptable and unacceptable activity. For
example, the Army Corps of Engineers uses a general permit to govern
the filling of wetlands protected by Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
allowing countless actors nationwide to obtain permission to fill
wetlands in accordance with federal guidance, and with state input.114
Environmental scholars have recognized the potential for this innovative
regulatory tool in future efforts to regulate the cumulative impacts of
activity with unwieldly numerous participants, such as greenhouse gas
production.115
This very brief introduction to the technology of environmental
governance shows that each type facilitates interjurisdictional decision
making in different ways. The usual model prioritizes national judgment
in setting goals and standards, while allowing local judgment to lead on
design and implementation.116 However, each seeks a different valence
of contribution from regulatory partners, some more cooperatively and
others more competitively, adjusting for the unique demands of each
substantive area of law.117 The resulting decisions incorporate multiscalar
input in ways that serve environmental governance well, and some
models of collaborative environmental governance might prove useful in
other areas of law as well.118
CONCLUSION: NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME
This essay has summarized a large body of work in a small space,
but I hope it has inspired you to reflect on three core ideas: (1) federalism
113. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at
407–08.
114. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Section 404 Permit
Program, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/ [https://perma.cc/DY79HWYS] (last updated July 3, 2017) (explaining the Section 404 general permit program);
US
Army
Corps
of
Engineers,
ORM
Permit
Decisions,
http://corpsmapu.usace.army.mil/egis/f?p=340:1:0:::::
[https://perma.cc/6W48-Z9Y6]
(last visited Sep. 23, 2014) (providing direction on how to apply for a § 404 general
permit). See also Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, General Permits and the Regulation of
Greenhouse Gases, REG. REV. (July 23, 2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/23-biberruhl-general-permits-and-the-regulation-of-greenhouse-gases.html
[https://perma.cc/T3R9-BAG3].
115. Biber & Ruhl, supra note 114(discussing the § 404 general permit option).
116. Id.
117. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8, at 400.
118. Id. at 413.
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forces us to grapple with inevitable conflicts among underlying good
governance values; (2) which can be especially exacerbated in contexts
of environmental law; and (3) negotiated governance can be a useful way
of managing the resulting problems of jurisdictional uncertainty. As I
conclude now, I would like to leave you with a fourth idea, perhaps the
most important point of all: that federalism is not a zero-sum game.
This is a big lift because the constitutional discourse has historically
presented federalism as exactly that—an epic power struggle between
state and federal actors in which every gain for one side is a loss for the
other.119 However, my research and that of others has revealed that the
boundary between state and federal power in the gray area is itself an
ongoing project of negotiation, and one that creates many opportunities
to avoid zero-sum distributions of power. Deployed wisely, both
collaborative and competitive means of joint decision making can
empower both sides—and more importantly, effective interjurisdictional
governance—if for no other reason, by ensuring that the ultimate policy
is informed by the concerns and wisdom of all levels of government
within our multiscalar system.120
The good news is the discourse is finally catching up. When I first
started writing about negotiated federalism, I criticized “armchair
federalism theory” for distorting the scholarly conversation about good
governance, citing a disturbing gap between what federalism looked like
in legal scholarship and what it actually looked like on the ground.121 I
critiqued the disjuncture between “federalism in rhetoric” and
“federalism in practice.”122 Ten years later, I am happy to report that the
literature is now closing that gap, thanks especially to dynamic
federalism theorists, or theorists by whatever name that study the
interaction between multiple levels of government as a site of continuous
contest, coordination, and exchange.
It is no accident that the pioneers of dynamic federalism came from
within environmental law, including scholars like Kirsten Engel,123 Bill

119. Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4–5. See also RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN,
supra note 4, at 267–68.
122. Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 4–5. See also RYAN,
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 4, at 267–68.
123. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, The Enigma of State Climate Change Policy
Innovation, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015); Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate
Change Initiatives in the Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432 (2009);
Kirsten H. Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State
and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); Kirsten H. Engel,
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Buzbee,124 Ann Carlson,125 Rob Glicksman,126 and many others127—but
the field has also benefited from theorists working in other areas of law,
like Erwin Chemerinsky,128 Heather Gerken,129 Jessica Bulman-Pozen,130

Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J.
159 (2006).
124. See generally William W. Buzbee, Climate Federalism, Regulatory Failure
and Reversal Risks, and Entrenching Innovation Incentives, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015); PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed.,
2009); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); William W.
Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).
125. See generally Ann Carlson & William Boyd, Accidents of Federalism:
Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016);
Ann Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: California's
Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2013); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative
Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009) ; Ann E.
Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 281 (2003).
126. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & David L. Markell, Dynamic
Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2016); Robert L.
Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. UNIV.
L. REV. 579 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism:
The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719
(2006).
127. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (2d ed. 2009); Hannah Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy
Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2016); Hari M. Osofsky and Hannah J. Wiseman,
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Abbe Gluck,131 and many others.132 Federalism theory has finally caught
up with federalism in the field, and the literature is now much more
cognizant of the role of consultation and contestation that informs good
multiscalar government. My hope is that this recognition, and ongoing
conversations like these, will lead us toward even better federalismsensitive policymaking and administration in the future.
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